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Much of recent metaphysical debate hinges on the notion of a truthmaker. 
According to David Armstrong’s characterization, a truthmaker for a true 
proposition is “some existent, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that 
truth is true.”2  For example, Lucy is the truthmaker for the proposition that Lucy 
exists. And the fact that Lucy is running (if there is such a thing) might be the 
truthmaker for the proposition that Lucy is running. The idea of a truthmaker is 
often used to “regiment metaphysical inquiry.”3 The thought is that asking what 
makes true propositions true is a good guide to ontological commitment. 
Perhaps the most trenchant problem in contemporary truthmaker theory is 
the problem of negative truths: it is hard to see what could make negative truths 
true, and intuitively, such truths do not even need truthmakers. For example, it is 
hard to see what portion of reality could make it true that Pegasus does not exist, 
and intuitively, ‘Pegasus does not exist’ is true because Pegasus does not exist, 
not because something else does exist. Very roughly, there are three approaches 
to the problem of negative truths in the contemporary literature. Some 
philosophers posit exotic entities like totality facts and negative facts as 
                                                
1 All translations are my own. Seventeenth-century works are cited according to their original 
divisions. This paper descended from papers read at the 2013 Princeton Penn Columbia Graduate 
Conference, the 2015 Truth and Grounds conference in Ascona, Switzerland, and the 2015 NEH 
seminar, “Between Medieval and Early Modern” in Boulder, CO. Thanks to the respective 
audience members for helpful input. This paper has also benefited from the comments of several 
readers and interlocutors, including (but probably not limited to): Megan Embry, Peter King, 
Adam Murray, Martin Pickavé, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Marleen Rozemond, David Sanson 
and Jessica Wilson. Finally, a reviewer for this journal provided insightful comments that helped 
me clarify the paper considerably.  
2 D. M. Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. 
3 Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers, 4. 
 2 
truthmakers for negative truths;4 others argue that more mundane entities, like 
the world, are truthmakers for negative truths;5 others reject the assumption that 
generates the problem in the first place – the assumption that negative truths 
have truthmakers.6  
Iberian and Italian scholastics of the seventeenth-century also had the notion 
of a truthmaker (‘verificativum’), and they engaged in sophisticated debates about 
truthmakers for various problematic truths, including modal truths, tensed 
truths, and negative truths. 7  In response to the problem of negative truths, 
seventeenth-century scholastics carved out roughly the same conceptual space 
that contemporary philosophers have carved out, typically endorsing one of 
three positions: (i) negative truths are made true by negative entities called 
‘lacks’; (ii) negative truths are made true by positive entities, including divine 
decrees; (iii) negative truths do not have truthmakers.8 While the conceptual 
space was broadly the same then as it is now, the details were developed quite 
differently. In this paper I explain how the third solution to the problem of 
negative truths was developed by Francisco Peinado (1633-1696).  
                                                
4 Armstrong posits totality facts in Truth and Truthmakers; Stephen Barker and Mark Jago posit 
negative facts in “Being Positive about Negative Facts,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
85 (2012), 117–38. 
5  Ross Cameron, “How To Be a Truthmaker Maximalist,” Noûs 42 (2008), 410–21; Jonathan 
Schaffer, “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker,” The Philosophical Quarterly 
60 (2010), 307–24. 
6  Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons, and Barry Smith, “Truth-Makers,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 44 (1984), 289, 314ff. 
7  On the advice of Sven Knebel, John Doyle was the first to translate ‘verificativum’ as 
‘truthmaker’. See John Doyle, “Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions,” Review of 
Metaphysics 48 (1995), 773, fn. 12. For more detailed discussions of truthmaking in seventeenth-
century scholasticism, see Jacob Schmutz “Verificativum,” in D. Calma, I. Atucha, C. König-
Pralong, I. Zavettero (eds.), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach, (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 739-
748; Brian Embry, “Truth and Truthmakers in Seventeenth-Century Scholasticism,” Journal of the 
American Philosophical Association 1 (2015), 196–216. 
8 For discussion of this debate, see Tilman Ramelow Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl. Die Metaphysik der 
Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Pérez S.J. (1599-1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1649-1716) (Leiden: Brill, 
1997), 230-50; Sven Knebel, Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Das System der moralischen 
Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik, 1550-1700 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 175-79; 
Jacob Schmutz, “Réalistes, nihilistes et incompatibilistes: le débat sur les negative truthmakers 
dans la scolastique Jésuite Espagnole,” Cahier de philosophie de l’Université de Caen [Special issue 
titled ‘Dire le Néant’] (2007), 131–78. For a detailed exposition of the first position, see Brian 
Embry, “An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative Entities: Thomas Compton Carleton on 
Lacks, Negations, and Privations,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2015), 22–45. 
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In the contemporary literature the fully general truthmaker principle – “all 
truths have truthmakers” – goes by the name ‘Truthmaker Maximalism’. I will 
argue that Peinado effectively restricts the truthmaker principle to positive 
truths, thereby rejecting Truthmaker Maximalism. But the position that I 
attribute to Peinado is widely rejected in the contemporary literature. George 
Molnar calls restriction of the truthmaker principle “the way of ontological 
frivolousness” and “truly desperate.”9 Trenton Merricks puts a finer point on the 
objection. Writing ‘Truthmaker’ for a fully general truthmaker principle, he says: 
The only reason to scale back Truthmaker to exempt negative existentials is that 
there do not seem to be truthmakers for negative existentials. Truthmaker theorists 
who proceed in this way have no principled objection to the cheater who, when 
confronted with her own apparently truthmakerless truths, scales back Truthmaker 
accordingly. For this cheater is simply adopting the strategy of the timid truthmaker 
theorist, concluding that since there do not seem to be any truthmakers for a certain 
kind of truth, none are required.10 
Ross Cameron writes in a similar vein: 
Either there’s something wrong with accepting truths that don’t have an ontological 
grounding or there isn’t: if there is, then every truth requires a grounding; if there 
isn’t, then no truth requires a grounding. Truthmaker theory is a theory about what 
it is for a proposition to be true; it’s not the kind of theory that can apply only in a 
restricted domain. What possible reason could one have for thinking of some 
propositions that they need to be grounded in what there is that doesn’t apply to all 
propositions? Why should it be okay for negative truths to go ungrounded and not 
okay for positive truths to go ungrounded?11 
The objection in these passages seems to be that restricting the truthmaker 
principle is ad hoc. What is needed is an independent reason to think that positive 
truths are grounded in reality, while negative truths are not.  
 My aim in this paper is to show (i) how Peinado restricts the truthmaker 
principle to positive truths, and (ii) how Peinado would answer the objection 
                                                
9 George Molnar, “Truthmakers for Negative Truths,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 
85. 
10 Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 40. 
11 Cameron, “How Not To Be a Truthmaker Maximalist,” 411-12. 
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from Merricks and Cameron. I will argue that Peinado provides independent 
reasons to think not only that negative truths do not have truthmakers, but that 
negative truths cannot have truthmakers. The paper proceeds as follows. In §2 I 
sketch a prevalent seventeenth-century theory of truth and truthmaking that is in 
the background of Peinado’s discussion. This stage-setting will help to make 
sense of Peinado’s positive view as well as the objections he considers likely to 
arise against his view. In §§3-4 I explain Peinado’s view of negative truths and 
the reasons he gives for restricting the truthmaker principle to positive truths. In 
§5 I explain how he responds (or could respond) to select objections. As we will 
see, the claim that negative truths do not have truthmakers does not perfectly 
capture Peinado’s position, but it is a good first pass, to be modified below in 
light of some problematic texts. For simplicity I will proceed through the next 
two sections as if Peinado’s position is simply that negative truths do not have 
truthmakers. I will then introduce and accommodate the textual difficulty in 
section 4. It is also important to note that here I focus on negations of atomic 
propositions, entirely setting aside the problem of finding truthmakers for 
universally quantified truths. The reason for this choice is that scholastics did not 
treat quantifiers the way we typically do, and their treatment deserves a 
discussion of its own. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The fact that early modern scholastics did in fact have a notion of truthmaking 
that at least approximates the contemporary notion is clear from their 
characterizations of truthmaking.12 Here are three examples (with ‘truthmaker’ 
translating ‘verificativum’): 
                                                
12 The material in this section follows the more thorough discussion in Brian Embry, “Truth and 
Truthmakers in Early Modern Scholasticism,” Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 
(2015), 196–216. 
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The immediate and formal truthmaker of a proposition is that by which a 
proposition is immediately and formally rendered true. (Francisco Peinado, 1633-
1696)13 
 
You have to say what it is for a proposition to be true and what is required in reality 
on the part of the object for the proposition to be true. The latter I call a truthmaker. 
(Giovannbattista Giattini, 1651)14 
 
In all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the 
proposition, is affirmed. (Silvestro Mauro, 1619-1687)15 
These passages suggest that for early modern scholastics a truthmaker is a 
portion of reality in virtue of which a truth-bearer is true. 
 The theory of truthmaking in the background of Peinado’s discussion arises 
from a prevalent answer to the seventeenth-century scholastic disputation, ‘What 
is truth?’. Before proceeding it will be useful to clarify what exactly this question 
about truth amounts to. ‘What is truth?’ is naturally understood in one of two 
ways. First, it might be asking for an analysis of what it is to be true. We could 
call this the ‘analytic question’. An answer to the analytic question would fill in 
the right-hand side of the schema: 
 
 x is true =df ____. 
 
As a point of comparison, an analytic question is what philosophers typically 
have in mind when they ask, ‘What is knowledge?’, and it is what Socrates has in 
mind when he asks Euthyphro, ‘What is piety?’ When the early modern 
scholastics ask ‘What is truth?’, however, they are not primarily interested in the 
analytic question. Rather, they are interested in what I call the ‘metaphysical 
question’. The metaphysical question asks what sort of thing truth is. Another 
way to put this question is to ask, in what ontological category does truth 
belong? Is truth a relation, a property, a being of reason, or something else 
                                                
13 Peinado, Disputationes in octos libros physicorum, lib. 1, d. 7, s. 2, nn. 12, p. 177.  
14 Giattini, Logica, q. 6, a. 5, p. 292.  
15 Mauro, Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus, 170 (ad 5).  
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altogether? Because early modern scholastics were primarily concerned with the 
metaphysical question, I will begin with the metaphysical question, and then I 
will show how a prevalent answer to the metaphysical question entails an 
answer to the analytic question. 
 Early modern scholastics standardly conceive of truth-bearers as token 
mental acts.16 These mental acts go by various names, including ‘proposition’, 
‘judgment’, ‘affirmation’, ‘cognition’, ‘mental act’, and sometimes just ‘act’. 
(Some of these terms can be seen in the above quotations about truthmakers). 
Going forward I will arbitrarily adopt the term ‘proposition’ for the relevant 
truth-bearing mental acts. But propositions in this sense are not abstract entities 
that provide semantic values for sentences. In the present context it is best to 
think of propositions as mental sentences. I will accordingly set off propositions 
with single quotation marks. The “content” of a proposition is its intentional 
object. 
Many seventeenth-century scholastics use the language of parts and wholes 
to describe truth. The common view seems to have been that the truth of a 
proposition p is the mereological sum of p and its intentional object. Giuseppe 
Polizzi describes this sort of view in the following passage. (Polizzi is an 
opponent of the view, but his description is useful on account of being especially 
straightforward): 
The first conclusion is that the object is not a part intrinsically composing formal 
truth and falsity. This is against Arriaga […] Oviedo […] and other contemporaries 
who think that truth is composed of two intrinsic parts, one of which is intrinsic to 
the proposition—indeed, it is the proposition itself—insofar as it affirms, for 
example, Peter’s running, and the other part is extrinsic to the proposition but 
                                                
16 Gabriel Vázquez held the minority view that truth-bearers are something like the contents of 
mental acts. Suárez rejects Vázquez’s view, and subsequently Suárez’s view becomes the 
mainstream Jesuit position. See Vázquez, Commentariorum ac disputationum in primam partem 
Sancti Thomae tomus primus d. 76, ch. 1, pp. 452ff. Suárez rejects Vázquez’s view in Disputationes 
metaphysicae (Hereafter DM) 8.1 (XXV, 275-7.). The parenthetical reference indicates the volume 
and page number of the Vivès edition of Suárez’s Opera. 
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intrinsic to the truth, and it is the object existing in the way in which it is affirmed 
by the proposition.17 
Acccording to this passage, many seventeenth-century scholastics thought that 
truth is a composite entity. The parts of an instance of truth are (i) a true 
proposition, and (ii) that proposition’s intentional object.  
As far as I have seen, seventeenth-century scholastics do not provide 
semantics for determining the intentional objects of propositions. Most often they 
give examples. So for example, they say that the object of the proposition that 
Peter is running is Peter’s running. Generally, the object of a proposition of the 
form ‘a is F’ is a’s Fness. So suppose that ‘Peter is running’ is about Peter’s 
running. On the view described by Polizzi, if Peter’s running exists, then the 
mereological sum of ‘Peter is running’ and Peter’s running exists. Hence, it is 
true that Peter is running.  
It should be noted that early modern scholastics tend to assume that we can 
think about things that do not exist. I can think about Peter’s running even if 
Peter’s running does not exist. In that case, the proposition that Peter is running 
would be false. The assumption that we can think about non-existent objects is 
controversial in the contemporary literature and may strike some as needing 
explication. Briefly, early modern scholastics standardly say that intentional 
objects that do not exist nonetheless have “objective being in the intellect”.18 For 
simplicity we can think of “objective being in the intellect” as delimiting a 
Meinongian third realm. But it should be noted that there were further debates 
                                                
17 Polizzi, Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius, d. 25, s. 4, n. 33, p. 366.  
18 This is a standard line that can be found in many disputations on beings of reason. It can also 
be seen in this colorful passage by Arriaga: “First, it cannot be denied that some acts are false and 
others are true. Second, it cannot be denied that false acts are false because their objects do not 
exist in reality as they are affirmed by the acts, whereas true acts are true because their objects are 
as they are affirmed to be by the acts. These two claims are really most certain and cannot be 
denied by anyone. From these claims I infer, therefore, that there are some acts whose objects do 
not exist in reality. I will give you an example: ‘A horse is rational’. The object of this act is a 
horse identified with rational, or a rational horse. But this horse does not exist in reality. Who 
would deny that? But it has being [est] through the intellect—that is, it is cognized by the intellect 
[…] Therefore the rational horse does not have being in reality, but only objective being in the 
intellect. (I really do not think this is denied by anyone, nor can it be)” (Cursus philosophicus, 
Metaph., d. 6, s. 2, n. 8, p. 783). 
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about the ontological status of the third realm. Very roughly, some thought that 
objective being is reducible to some existing mental item, and others denied that 
objective being is so reducible.19 I do not want to enter that debate here, but I 
hope these sketchy remarks will help contemporary readers entertain the 
conceptual framework that supports the early modern scholastic debates about 
truthmaking. 
I’ll call the view described above by Polizzi ‘the composite theory of truth’. 
As I understand it, the composite theory can be formulated as follows: 
 
The Composite Theory of Truth: The truth of a proposition p = the 
mereological sum of p and the intentional object of p. 
 
Given the above remarks about objective being, a worry now arises:20 if merely 
objective beings can enter into composition relations, then every proposition will 
be trivially true just in virtue of having an intentional object. As far as I have 
seen, early modern scholastics did not explicitly address this worry. But one way 
to block the worry is to restrict composition to things that exist. This move is in 
keeping with the way the composite theory is often formulated in terms of 
propositions and their existing objects. (See the Polizzi quotation above and the 
first Arriaga quotation below.)  
At any rate, the composite theory of truth appears to have been standard 
among seventeenth-century Jesuits, as suggested by the following remark from 
Luis de Losada: 
The common opinion in our School is that truth consists in a complex of an act and 
an object.21 
                                                
19 I take it this is what Suárez is concerned with at DM 54.2.3-4 (XXVI, 1019). 
20 Thanks to a reviewer for pressing this worry. 
21 Losada, Cursus philosophici prima pars, t. 5, d. 2, ch. 1, n. 2 p. 231 (erroneously marked as p. 131). 
See also Mangold, Philosophia recentior, vol. 1, Ontology, diss. 4, a. 1, s. 4, n. 98, p. 96. 
 9 
 On the plausible assumption that the parts of truth are essential parts,22 the 
composite view of truth entails what I call the standard analysis of truth: 
 
Standard Analysis of Truth: p is true =df p exists and the intentional object of 
p exists. 
 
The standard analysis is often endorsed explicitly. To give just one passage, 
Roderigo de Arriaga writes: 
For a proposition to be true is nothing other than for it to affirm [for example] 
Peter’s running, and for this to exist in reality. But this implies two things: the 
proposition and the existence of the object. [my emphasis]23 
It is not hard to see why early modern scholastics would have been attracted to 
the standard analysis of truth. Most early modern scholastics pay tribute to 
tradition by endorsing a conformity theory of truth. However, there was 
disagreement about how to understand the conformity theory. As Sebastián 
Izquierdo (1601-1681) tells us, “Both ancient and modern philosophers think that 
truth must be conformity between a cognition and the thing cognized, even if 
they are not in conformity in explaining what such a conformity amounts to.”24 
The disagreement arises because the claim that truth is conformity is not very 
illuminating. The standard analysis dispenses with the mysterious notion of 
conformity and analyzes truth in terms of (i) intentionality and (ii) existence. 
Existence is arguably primitive, admitting of no further analysis.25 And while it 
may be difficult to explain how intentionality works, most philosophers will 
accept the occurrence of intentionality, and it is therefore available in most 
                                                
22 This idea is implicit in the quotation from Giattini above. In one place Polizzi claims that the 
parts of truth, on the composite theory, are like the body and soul of a human being, precisely 
because body and soul are not only parts but essential parts of a human being. (Polizzi, 
Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius, d. 25, s. 5, n. 49, p. 369). 
23 Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus, Logic, d. 14, s. 1, subs. 5, n. 27, p. 170. 
24 Izquierdo, Pharus scientiarum, t. 2, d. 3, q. 1, n. 3, p. 110. 
25 There was actually a debate about whether being is primitive. For the affirmative, see Giattini, 
Logica, q. 6, a. 2, p. 259ff. 
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philosophical toolkits. At any rate, if intentionality is a mystery, it is everyone’s 
mystery, not only the conformity theorist’s. The standard analysis of truth 
therefore improves on the conformity theory by reducing conformity to existence 
and intentionality. 
The composite theory and the standard analysis of truth drive the account of 
truthmaking that is in the background of Peinado’s discussion of truthmakers for 
negative truths. Many early modern scholastics speak of truthmakers both as 
parts of truth and as intentional objects of propositions. So the idea seems to be 
that a proposition’s intentional object is that proposition’s truthmaker because 
the proposition is true just in case that object exists.  
The standard analysis of truth is fully general, so it entails that every truth 
has a truthmaker. Several seventeenth-century scholastics explicitly commit 
themselves to a fully general truthmaker principle. To reiterate the above 
quotation from Mauro, “in all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual 
truthmaker of the proposition, is affirmed” (my emphasis).26 And the author of 
an anonymous disputation on truthmaking tells us, “every act that is strictly true 
in the present ought to have a truthmaker strictly existing in the present.”27  
The fully general truthmaker principle was often used to motivate realism 
about negative entities called ‘negations’ and ‘lacks’. For example, 
Giovannbattista Giattini constructs the following truthmaker argument for the 
existence of negations: 
It seems like you have to say that there are negations in reality…. This conclusion is 
proven because there must be a formal truthmaker for a negative proposition—for 
example, for the proposition by which I say “Light is not in the air”. But this 
                                                
26 Mauro, Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus, 170 (ad 5). This claim does not entail that 
every proposition is true but that every proposition affirms the existence of a truthmaker. If I 
affirm the existence of Pegasus, my affirmation is true if and only if Pegasus exists. Similarly, if p 
affirms the existence of a truthmaker T, p is true if and only if T exists. Hence, every true 
proposition has a truthmaker. 
27 Anon., Disputatio de obiecto et verificativo propositionum, f. 220v. 
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truthmaker is not something positive. Therefore, it is a negation, distinct from 
everything positive.28 
Although he does not use the term ‘truthmaker’ in the following passage, 
Thomas Compton Carleton’s realism about negative entities is clearly motivated 
by the idea that truths have truthmakers. He writes: 
That the man is dead, that the fire is extinguished, that Peter is not sitting and is not 
reading, that Paul is blind, and six hundred other such propositions, are no less 
true, really and mind-independently, than that the man lives, that Peter sees, &c. 
Therefore there must be something in reality from which the denomination [‘true’] 
comes to these propositions. But that could not be anything except negations.29 
As we will see, Peinado wants to excise negations from his ontology, and he 
wants to resist these truthmaker arguments for the existence of negations.  
 
3. PEINADO ON NEGATIVE TRUTHS 
Peinado’s view of negative truths is largely driven by a distinctive view of truth-
bearers, which emerges in a debate about whether contradictory propositions p 
and ¬p have the same intentional object. Peinado answers this question in the 
affirmative, his opponents in the negative. Peinado’s opponents typically claim 
that positive propositions are about positive entities, and negative propositions 
are about negative entities. More specifically, they claim that if p is about some 
positive entity x, then ¬p is about the lack of x, where the lack of x is a sui generis 
negative entity that is incompatible with the existence of x.30 I will call this the 
‘object view’ of affirmation and negation, since it asserts that contradictory 
propositions differ according to their intentional objects. When paired with the 
composite view of truth, the object view entails that negative truths are made 
true by negative entities; indeed, it is noteworthy that Polizzi, an advocate of the 
                                                
28 Giattini, Logica, q. 6, a. 2, p. 265. 
29 Carleton, Philosophia universa, Logic, d. 18, s. 2, n. 6, p. 82.  
30 See Carleton, Philosophia universa, Logic, d. 18, s. 6, nn. 2-4, p. 84. For a detailed exposition of a 
seventeenth-century theory of lacks, see Embry, “An Early Modern Scholastic Theory of Negative 
Entities.” 
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object view, describes those who are opposed to the object view as motivated by 
the desire to reject negative entities.31 Note that on the object view, the term ‘not’ 
plays a role in determining the intentional object of a proposition: if ‘Peter is 
running’ is about Peter’s running, then ‘Peter is not running’ is about the lack of 
Peter’s running.  
 Others reject the assumption that ‘not’ plays a role in determining the 
intentional object of a proposition. This can be seen in the following passage by 
Luis de Losada. 
In conditional acts, copulative acts, and disjunctive or vague acts, the particles ‘if’, 
‘and’, and ‘or’ do not represent some conditionality, copulation, or disjunction or 
vagueness on the part of the object; they merely indicate a certain way of 
representing. The same thing must be said about the particle ‘not’ in negative acts.32 
According to Losada’s view, the disjunction ‘Peter is running or Paul is running’ 
is about Peter’s running on the one hand and Paul’s running on the other, and it 
represents those objects in a disjunctive way. Losada applies this view to 
negation. The idea is that if ‘Peter is running’ is about Peter’s running, then ‘Peter 
is not running’ is also about Peter’s running. Hence, contradictory propositions p 
and ¬p differ not according to their intentional objects but according to a “way of 
representing” intentional objects. The relevant “way of representing” is often 
called a “modus tendendi”, which I translate henceforth as ‘intentional mode’.  
Peinado illustrates distinct intentional modes with the case of love and hate. 
Love and hate have intentional objects, and they are different not because they 
have different intentional objects but because they are different ways of being 
cognitively related to their objects. Similarly, affirmation and negation are 
different ways of being cognitively related to an intentional object. I call this the 
‘intentional mode view’ of affirmation and negation: 
                                                
31 Polizzi, Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius, d. 50, s. 9, n. 160, p. 668. 
32 Losada, Cursus philosophici tertia pars, Metaphysics, d. 4, ch. 3, n. 29, p. 157. See also Izquierdo, 
Pharus scientiarum, d. 2, q. 4, n. 171, p. 83; d. 2, q. 4, prop. 4, pp. 89ff; Lugo, Disputationes 
scholasticae et morales, d. 1, s. 3, nn. 13-14, pp. 3-4; nn. 17-25, pp. 4-5. Lugo’s discussion seems to 
have been influential on the intentional mode camp. 
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The intentional mode view: p and ¬p have the same object and different 
intentional modes. 
 
The fact that Peinado endorses the intentional mode view is clear from the 
following passage: 
The affirmative and negative judgments mentioned above [‘Peter exists’, and ‘Peter 
does not exist’] do not differ according to object, but both have for their object the 
existence of Peter. But they differ according to their intentional modes.33 
In this passage, Peinado says that the propositions ‘Peter exists’ and ‘Peter does 
not exist’ are both about the existence of Peter, and they differ only according to 
their intentional modes. 
 Peinado has several arguments for the intentional mode view. Here I will 
paraphrase two of them. Peinado thinks that we can deny content as well as 
affirm it. Using contemporary terminology, we could say that Peinado 
distinguishes between the force and the content of a proposition, and he further 
distinguishes between two kinds of force: positive and negative. The intentional 
mode view can account for these distinctions. The “content” of a proposition is 
its intentional object; the “force” of a proposition is its intentional mode. Thus, a 
positive proposition p affirms its object, and ¬p denies its object. With this in 
mind, Peinado raises a dilemma for the object view. Consider the proposition 
that Peter does not exist. Does ‘Peter does not exist’ have an affirmative or a 
negative intentional mode? The advocate of the object view cannot say that ‘Peter 
does not exist’ has a negative intentional mode for the following reason: on the 
object view, ‘Peter does not exist’ is about the lack of Peter. So if ‘Peter does not 
exist’ had a negative intentional mode, it would deny the lack of Peter, and it 
would therefore be true when Peter exists, which is absurd. So the object view is 
committed to the claim that ‘Peter does not exist’ has an affirmative intentional 
                                                
33 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.3, n. 25, p. 262.  
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mode. But in that case, the object view cannot account for the distinction between 
positive and negative force. On the object view, then, we can only ever affirm 
content; we cannot deny it.34 This consequence of the object view is sometimes 
explicitly embraced. In a quotation we have already seen, Mauro claims that “in 
all propositions some existence, or the ultimate actual truthmaker of the 
proposition, is affirmed” (my emphasis).35 Here Mauro explicitly states that all 
propositions are affirmative. But since we apparently can deny as well as affirm 
things, Peinado thinks we ought to endorse the intentional mode view of 
affirmation and negation.36 
 Peinado also thinks that intentional objects are not fine grained enough to 
account for the difference between positive and negative propositions. This is 
because propositions with the same object might nonetheless differ with respect 
to polarity—one might be positive and the other negative. To see this, consider 
an example. According to the object view of negation, ‘Peter does not exist’ is 
about the lack of Peter. ‘The lack of Peter exists’ is also about the lack of Peter, yet 
‘The lack of Peter exists’ is not syntactically negative. So here we have a positive 
and a negative proposition about the same intentional object. The intentional 
object alone therefore cannot discriminate between the positive and negative 
propositions. On the intentional mode view, however, ‘Peter does not exist’ is 
negative because it has a negative intentional mode, and ‘The lack of Peter exists’ 
is positive because it has a positive intentional mode. 
 Peinado’s view of negative truths is driven by his intentional mode view of 
negation, together with what I call ‘the aboutness constraint on truthmaking’. 
                                                
34 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 26, p. 262. 
35 Mauro, Quaestionum philosophicarum liber secundus, 170 (ad 5). 
36 Of course Peinado has not eliminated all the options with this argument. One might say, as 
Ockham apparently did, that propositions – rather than the objects of propositions – are the 
objects of affirmation and denial. On this view affirmation and denial are not built into 
propositions at all. This view does not appear to have been on Peinado’s radar, but it is not 
without difficulties. As Walter Chatton pointed out, the phenomenology of affirmation and 
denial tells against Ockham’s view, since we typically are not thinking about a mental act when 
we affirm or deny something. For more objections to Ockham’s view, see Susan Brower-Toland, 
“Facts vs. Things: Adam Wodeham and the Later Medieval Debate About Objects of Judgment,” 
The Review of Metaphysics 60 (2007), 597–642. 
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Aboutness Constraint: If T makes p true, then p is about T. 
 
Recall that the standard analysis of truth entails that truths are about their 
truthmakers, so the aboutness constraint was widely accepted by Peinado’s 
contemporaries. Peinado also accepts the aboutness constraint, as is clear from 
the following passage: 
It seems obvious that no internal or external speech and no act of the intellect is 
rendered true by something that it does not say, by an object that it does not 
represent. For who would say that this act, ‘Peter runs’, is formally made true by the 
existence of God or by any other entity distinct from the running of Peter, which the 
act represents?37 
Peinado thinks that the aboutness constraint is “obvious,” and he brings the 
obviousness out with an example. Imagine someone saying that God is the 
truthmaker for ‘Peter runs’.38  Peinado finds such a view obviously absurd. 
Peinado’s diagnosis of the situation is that ‘Peter runs’ is about Peter’s running, 
not God. More generally, true propositions are about the things that make them 
true. It is worth noting that many contemporary truthmaker theorists subject 
truthmaking to a relevance constraint due to worries about trivial truthmakers 
for necessary truths.39 One way to cash out such a relevance constraint is to insist 
that truths be about their truthmakers. 
 Peinado’s restriction of the truthmaker principle is driven by the intentional 
mode view of affirmation and negation and the aboutness constraint on 
                                                
37 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 32, p. 265.  
38 Some of Peinado’s contemporaries thought that God’s decrees are truthmakers for negative 
truths and tensed truths, and God himself is the truthmaker for all necessary truths. God’s 
decrees are handy truthmakers because it is necessarily the case that if God decrees that p, then p 
is true. Against this, Peinado claims that propositions about ordinary creaturely objects ought to 
be made true by ordinary creaturely objects, not by God’s decrees. See Mauro, Quaestionum 
philosophicarum liber secundus, qq. 47, 49, 51. 
39 The worry is that, absent a relevance constraint, anything can make true any necessary truth, 
since anything necessitates any necessary truth. But this trivialized truthmaking for necessary 
truths. See Greg Restall, “Truthmakers, Entailment, and Necessity,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 74 (1996), 333–34; Armstrong, Truth and Truthmakers, 10–12; Merricks, Truth and 
Ontology, 22–34. 
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truthmaking. Peinado nowhere gives an argument for the claim that negative 
truths do not generally have truthmakers. Instead, he proceeds piecemeal. His 
target is a particular version of the view that negative truths are made true by 
lacks.40 The details of this theory are unimportant, for as we shall see, Peinado’s 
argument generalizes. Peinado argues as follows: 
A negative proposition (for example, ‘Peter does not exist’) does not have for its 
object the lack of Peter, but that existence which it negates […] But no proposition is 
made true by something that is not its object […] Therefore, a lack identified with 
something positive is not necessary for making negative propositions true.41 
The argument here is simple: ‘Peter does not exist’ is not about the lack of Peter; 
so, by the aboutness constraint, ‘Peter does not exist’ is not made true by the lack 
of Peter. Peinado can run this kind of argument on any proposed truthmaker for 
‘Peter does not exist’. For example, suppose one of Peinado’s opponents were to 
claim that ‘Peter does not exist’ is made true by God’s decree that Peter not 
exist.42 Peinado will insist that ‘Peter does not exist’ is about Peter, not a divine 
decree. So ‘Peter does not exist’ is not made true by a divine decree. More 
generally, for any x (x ≠ Peter), ‘Peter does not exist’ is not about x, and ‘Peter 
does not exist’ is therefore not made true by x. Because ‘Peter does not exist’ is 
about Peter, Peter is the only thing that could make it true that Peter does not 
exist. But since Peter makes it true that Peter exists, Peter cannot be the 
truthmaker for ‘Peter does not exist’, on pain of contradiction. It follows that 
‘Peter does not exist’ does not have a truthmaker. This argument generalizes. 
Hence, negative truths do not have truthmakers. 
 In order to make Peinado’s commitments explicit, it is worth noting that the 
above argument hinges on the assumption that ‘Peter exists’ is true if its 
                                                
40 Some of Peinado’s contemporaries claimed that negative truths are made true by lacks, but 
then they identified these lacks with positive entities in order to make them seem more 
respectable. That is the view in Peinado’s sights here. 
41 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. s, d. 4, s. 2, n. 23, p. 211.  
42  In fact, one of Peinado’s opponents makes precisely that claim: Mauro, Quaestionum 
philosophicarum liber secundus, q. 49, pp. 197ff. For arguments against Mauro’s position, see 
Giattini, Logica, q. 6, a. 2, pp. 260-65. 
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intentional object – Peter – exists (assuming the proposition, ‘Peter exists’ exists). 
Peinado needs a general version of this claim in order for the argument to 
generalize. I will call the general version ‘positive truth’: 
 
Positive Truth: A positive proposition p is true if p exists and the intentional 
object of p exists. 
 
Peinado’s opponents would have accepted Positive Truth because it follows from 
the standard analysis of truth. And although Peinado rejects the standard 
analysis of truth as conflicting with his view of negative truths, he accepts the 
standard analysis as restricted to positive truths. Hence, Peinado too accepted 
Positive Truth. The intentional mode view, the aboutness constraint on 
truthmaking, and Positive Truth together entail that negative truths do not have 
truthmakers. 
 
4. A TEXTUAL DIFFICULTY 
Unfortunately, Peinado does not explicitly say that negative truths do not have 
truthmakers. In fact, he sometimes states that negative truths do have 
truthmakers. For example, he says: 
The truthmaker for the negative act, ‘Peter does not exist’, is Peter negatively 
represented by that act. Say the same thing about any other negative act.43 
 
The formal truthmaker of an affirmative proposition is the existence affirmed. 
Therefore, the formal truthmaker of a negative proposition is nothing other than the 
existence denied.44 
Far from endorsing the position I have attributed to Peinado, in these passages 
Peinado explicitly states that negative truths have truthmakers. Moreover, his 
claims about truthmakers for negative truths in these passages are deeply 
                                                
43 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 32, p. 266.   
44 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 34, p. 266.  
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puzzling. In the first passage Peinado says that ‘Peter negatively represented’ 
makes it true that Peter does not exist. Is Peter negatively represented the same 
thing as Peter? If so, how can Peter make it true that Peter does not exist? If not, 
what sort of thing is Peter negatively represented? The sense of the second 
passage seems to be that one existence makes contradictory propositions true. 
But if that is the case, then that one existence would make a contradiction true. So 
what is going on in these passages?  
Peinado is aware of the fact that his view is non-standard and potentially 
confusing. In response to the worries I just raised about his position, he offers 
some clarification: 
When we say, “A non-existent object makes a negative proposition true,” by this act 
we take the object negatively, since it is the same as to say, “The object does not 
exist, and the proposition says that and nothing else.”45 
This passage makes it clear that Peinado thinks that non-existent objects make 
negative propositions true. As he explains, when he says that a non-existent 
object makes a negative proposition true, he means that the proposition says that 
its object does not exist, and its object does not exist. So the idea seems to be that 
Peter, by failing to exist, makes it true that Peter does not exist. It therefore seems 
likely that when Peinado speaks of “Peter negatively represented,” he means 
something like “Peter, considered as non-existent.” 
Peinado claims in several passage that non-existent objects are truthmakers 
for negative truths. In one such passage, he claims that the Antichrist makes it 
true that the Antichrist does not exist. He then considers the following objection: 
When this act [‘The Antichrist does not exist’] is true, its truthmaker exists, for it is 
denominated ‘true’ from its truthmaker. But when this true act exists, the Antichrist 
does not exist. Therefore something else exists, which is its truthmaker.46 
Peinado responds to this objection by rejecting the major premise. He writes: 
                                                
45 Peinado, De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.4, n. 37, p. 268.  
46 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224. 
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I deny the major premise…. For if the truthmaker of a negative act – namely, its 
object – existed when the act exists, the act would be false; hence, for the act to be 
true, it is required that, when the true act exists, its truthmaker does not exist. On 
the contrary, the act is true precisely because its truthmaker does not exist.47 
In the face of the objection Peinado maintains quite explicitly that negative truths 
have truthmakers that do not exist. The Antichrist, by failing to exist, makes it 
true that the Antichrist does not exist. 
Put this way, I think Peinado’s view is still a bit confusing to contemporary 
ears. How can a proposition be made true by something that does not exist? 
Peinado’s position can be illuminated with some terminology that was 
introduced by his colleague at the University of Alcalá, Juan de Ulloa Madritano 
(1639-1723). Madritano endorses Peinado’s position, and to help explain the 
position he introduces a distinction between truthmakers in the positive sense 
and truthmakers in the negative sense. He describes truthmakers in the positive 
sense as follows: 
The truthmaker of any act in the positive sense is that which the act is about 
[attingitur per actum], and additionally is such that when it exists, in proportion to 
the intentional mode, the act is true, and when it is absent, the act is false.48 
Based on this passage, truthmakers in the positive sense are what early modern 
scholastics standardly think of as truthmakers. For the sake of clarity, we can 
define a truthmaker in the positive sense as follows: 
 
T is a truthmaker in the positive sense for p =df p is about T, and p is true if 
and only if T exists. 
 
Madritano then describes truthmakers in the negative sense as follows: 
                                                
47 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224. 
48 Madritano, Prodromus, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 53, p. 776.  
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A truthmaker in the negative sense I call that which the act is about and is such that 
the act is true if [and only if] it does not exist. Notice the difference here with a 
truthmaker in the positive sense.49 
Based on this passage and others like it, we can define truthmakers in the 
negative sense as follows: 
 
T is a truthmaker in the negative sense for p =df p is about T, and p is true if 
and only if T does not exist. 
 
And now we can express Peinado’s view using the new terminology. Peinado’s 
truthmaker principle states: 
 
Peinado’s truthmaker principle: Positive truths have truthmakers in the 
positive sense but not in the negative sense. (First order) negative truths have 
truthmakers in the negative sense but not in the positive sense. 
 
Madritano nicely summarizes the Peinadian view of negative truths as follows: 
You will say, so what is required for a negative proposition to be true? I respond 
that nothing is required in the positive sense, since negative propositions are not of 
the sort that strictly and properly require anything in order to be true; rather, they 
are of the sort whose truth is precisely prevented by something—namely, by the 
existence of their object.50 
So when Peinado says that ‘Peter does not exist’ is made true by Peter negatively 
represented, he means that Peter is the truthmaker in the negative sense for ‘Peter 
does not exist’. And this amounts to the claim that ‘Peter does not exist’ is true 
because it is about Peter, and Peter does not exist. 
                                                
49 Madritano, Prodromus, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 54, p. 777. I add the material in brackets in light of other 
remarks made by Madritano, but nothing in this paper hangs on the addition. 
50 Madritano, Prodromus, d. 7, ch. 7, n. 59, p. 782. 
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5. OBJECTIONS 
a. First objection: alethic pluralism 
As we have seen, Peinado’s truthmaker principle is largely motivated by his 
intentional mode view of affirmation and negation. Notice that the standard 
analysis of truth is not available to someone who endorses the intentional mode 
view. This can be seen by way of example. According to Peinado, ‘Peter is 
running’ is about Peter’s running. From the intentional mode view, it follows 
that ‘Peter is not running’ is also about Peter’s running. Hence, if the standard 
analysis of truth is correct, ‘Peter is not running’ is true if and only if Peter’s 
running exists, which is obviously incorrect. So Peinado is not entitled to the 
standard analysis of truth. 
 As mentioned above, Peinado accepts the standard analysis of truth with 
respect to positive truths, but in order to accommodate his view of negation, he 
must modify the analysis with respect to negative truths, and this is precisely 
what he does: 
For a negative act to be true now is for the act to exist now and for its object not to 
exist, since the act says that its object does not exist.51 
So it seems that Peinado has distinct analyses of truth of positive and negative 
propositions. His analysis of truth for positive propositions is given by the 
standard analysis. And Peinado analyzes truth for negative truths as follows: 
 
Negative Truth: A negative proposition ¬p is true =df ¬p exists and the object 
of ¬p does not exist.52 
 
So Peinado appears to be a sort of alethic pluralist. Yet Peinado’s opponents 
commonly reject alethic pluralism. As Suárez writes, “truth ought to have the 
                                                
51 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224. 
52 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 5, n. 55, p. 224. 
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same account [ratio] in every case.” 53  It is not clear exactly why Peinado’s 
opponents reject alethic pluralism. Perhaps they were concerned with theoretical 
parsimony. But it is worth noting that alethic pluralism has some problems well 
known from the contemporary literature. To give one example, we say that an 
argument is valid if and only if it is truth-preserving. If there is a unified analysis 
of truth, the concept of truth can help us explain validity. We can say that when 
an argument is truth-preserving, there is some one condition or property such 
that, if the premises satisfy it, then the conclusion satisfies it. But if there are 
different kinds of truth for different proposition types, it is no longer clear what 
truth-preservation amounts to. Further, if truth is different for positive and 
negative truths, it is unclear what we should say about the truth of a conjunction 
of a positive and a negative truth, or about iterated negations. Still further, 
Peinado thinks that every logical connective is an intentional mode,54 and he 
presumably would want to make the same sort of moves with respect to other 
logically complex truths as he does with respect to negative truths. But then his 
analyses of truth must proliferate according to the infinitely many kinds of 
logically complex truths. 
 Unfortunately, Peinado does not respond to the charge of alethic pluralism. I 
will briefly deviate from the project of explaining Peinado’s account of 
truthmakers for negative truths in order to explain how someone attracted to 
Peinado’s account could provide an analysis of truth that preserves Peinado’s 
other commitments and dodges the charge of alethic pluralism. 
The idea is to use a recursive analysis inspired by Alfred Tarski, with a 
correspondence theoretic base clause that helps preserve Peinado’s commitments 
                                                
53 DM 8.2.2 (XXV, 277). Some of Peinado’s opponents argue to the effect that someone who 
endorses the intentional mode view cannot account for truth. See Giattini, Logica, q. 6, a. 5, pp. 
292-3; Polizzi, Philosophicarum disputationum tomus tertius, d. 50, s. 9, nn. 161-6, pp. 668-9. 
54 It is not clear what Peinado would say about the intentional modes of logically complex 
propositions with multiple logical connectives. Does such a proposition feature nested intentional 
modes? Or do the various logical connectives somehow work together to form a new intentional 
mode? It is not immediately clear how Peinado would answer this questions, or even what hangs 
on it.  
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about truthmaking.55 For simplicity I want to start by assuming that there is only 
one logical connective, negation (¬), and I want to set aside tense, modality, and 
other complicating syntactical features. I will understand atomic propositions to 
be propositions free of logical connectives – hence, only positive propositions are 
atomic. Focusing thus on a part of a language, we can define truth as follows: 
  
The Recursive Analysis of Truth* 
1.   Where p is any atomic proposition, p is true if and only if the intentional 
object of p exists. 
2.   Where p is any proposition 
a.   ¬p is true if and only if p is not true. 
 
Clause 1 expresses Peinado’s analysis of truth for positive truths. It therefore 
entails the first part of Peinado’s truthmaker principle, that every atomic 
proposition has a truthmaker in the positive sense. The recursive analysis, 
together with the intentional mode view and the aboutness constraint, entails 
that negative truths have truthmakers in the negative sense but not in the 
positive sense. This can be seen as follows. Consider the negation, ¬p of the 
atomic proposition p. According to clause 2, ¬p is true if and only if p is not true. 
According to clause 1 p is not true if and only if its object does not exist. 
According to the intentional mode view of negation, the object of ¬p is the object 
of p. So, ¬p is true if and only if its object does not exist. Given the definition of 
‘truthmaker in the negative sense’, it follows that ¬p has a truthmaker in the 
negative sense (its object) but not in the positive sense. So the recursive analysis 
preserves Peinado’s truthmaker principle. A further benefit of the recursive 
                                                
55 This idea is suggested in Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, “Truth-Makers”. For brief discussion of 
the recursive correspondence theory of truth, see Marian David, Correspondence and Disquotation: 
An Essay on the Nature of Truth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 119-124. David notes 
that someone adopting the recursive analysis cannot define the logical connectives in terms of 
truth, on pain of circularity. Special thanks to Adam Murray and Jessica Wilson for discussion 
here.  
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analysis is that it defines truth for iterated negation.56 And crucially, it is not a 
form of alethic pluralism, precisely because it is recursive. It should be noted, 
however, that the recursive analysis does not fit well with the idea that primary 
truth-bearers are token mental sentences. If primary truth-bearers are token 
mental sentences, then the recursive analysis defines the truth of one token in 
terms of the truth of another token, and there is no guarantee that the second 
token exists. One way to avoid this problem is to pair the recursive analysis with 
the idea that primary truth-bearers are mental sentence types that exist even 
when their tokens do not.57 
 As we have seen, Peinado and many of his contemporaries endorse an 
intentional mode view not only of negation but for of all logical connectives. For 
reasons similar to those explained in §3 above, it follows that the standard 
analysis of truth is not adequate with respect to molecular propositions. As far as 
I have seen, Peinado does not discuss molecular propositions involving 
conjunction and disjunction, but we can account for them in the recursive 
analysis by adding a clause for conjunction: 
 
The Recursive Analysis of Truth  
1.   Where p is any atomic proposition, p is true if and only if the intentional 
object of p exists. 
2.   Where p and q are any propositions 
a.   ¬p is true if and only if p is not true; 
b.   p ⋀ q is true if and only if p is true and q is true 
 
                                                
56 According to clause 2, ¬¬p is true if and only if ¬p is not true; applying clause 2 again, ¬p is not 
true if and only if p is true. And now according to clause 1, p is true if and only if its object exists. 
Putting all this together, we get ¬¬p is true if and only if the object of p exists. But according to 
the intentional mode view, the object of ¬¬p is the object of p. So ¬¬p is true if and only if its 
object exists. It follows that ¬¬p has a truthmaker in the positive sense. 
57 For a contemporary defense of the view that propositions are mental act types, see Scott 
Soames, What Is Meaning? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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The remaining logical connectives can be defined in terms of conjunction and 
negation. Clauses 1-2b will tell us what is required on the part of the object(s) of a 
molecular proposition in order for that proposition to be true.  
 
b. Second objection: privative propositions 
One might wonder what Peinado would say about truths like ‘Peter is blind’. 
Because ‘Peter is blind’ is syntactically positive, Peinado must assign it a 
truthmaker (if it is true), by his own lights. But it seems that ‘Peter is blind’ is in 
some sense negative. So it seems that Peinado must assign truthmakers to some 
negative truths.58 
I do not think that the above consideration presents any special problems for 
Peinado. His account of negative truths is neutral with respect to metaphysical 
theories of blindness, for example. Peinado insists that ‘a is F’ is true just in case 
a’s Fness exists. Hence, Peinado can say that ‘Peter is blind’ is true just in case 
Peter’s blindness exists. Nor does it follow that ‘Peter is blind’ is negative in 
Peinado’s sense. Peinado’s account of negative truths is an account of 
syntactically negative truths. Which truths are syntactically negative is built into 
the metaphysical structure of the truths themselves: the negative truths are all 
and only the ones with negative intentional modes.59 Because ‘Peter is blind’ is 
affirmative, it is not negative in Peinado’s sense. 
As it turns out, Peinado rejects the existence of things like blindness and 
lacks more generally. For our purposes it does not matter why Peinado rejects 
the existence of lacks. The point I want to focus on is that because Peinado rejects 
the existence of lacks, Peinado claims that propositions such as ‘Peter is blind’ are 
literally false: 
                                                
58 Peinado considers this objection in De anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2, subs. 4, n. 39, p. 268. For a 
contemporary version of the objection, see Molnar, “Truthmakers for Negative Truths.”  
59 For simplicity I ignore iterated negation here, which these claims can easily be adjusted to 
accommodate. 
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These propositions seem to be affirmative: ‘Peter fails to be [deficit]’, ‘Peter is 
excluded from things’, ‘There is a lack of Peter’. In these and similar propositions 
the verbs are alienated from their proper to their improper signification […] For 
those verbs, properly taken, properly signify that the defect, exclusion, and the lack 
of Peter exist in reality […] Thus all the above propositions, if they are not taken in a 
sense equivalent to negative propositions, are false.60 
I take it Peinado is making two moves in this passage. In one move, he is 
admitting that propositions like ‘There is a lack of Peter’ are literally false. In 
light of his analysis of truth for positive propositions, it is easy to see why 
Peinado would say that such propositions are literally false. ‘There is a lack of 
Peter’ is about the lack of Peter, so it is true just in case the lack of Peter exists. 
Peinado thinks that lacks do not exist; a fortiori, the lack of Peter does not exist. 
Hence, ‘There is a lack of Peter’ is literally false, even if Peter does not exist. 
Peinado would say the same sort of thing about ‘Peter is blind’. (False because 
Peter’s blindness does not exist, even if Peter cannot see.) 
However, in the second move, Peinado claims that propositions like ‘Peter is 
blind’ can be taken as somehow equivalent to negative propositions, in which 
case they come out true. There is a question here how exactly syntactically 
positive propositions can be “taken in a sense equivalent to negative 
propositions”. This has to do with Peinado’s doctrine of alienation, which occurs 
when a verb receives non-standard signification in virtue of other terms in a 
proposition.61 A detailed discussion of the semantics of alienation would take us 
                                                
60 Peinado, De generatione et corruptione, lib. 1, t. 2, d. 4, s. 4, n. 39, p. 217. See also Peinado, De 
anima, lib. 2, d. 3, s. 2.3, n. 26, p. 263.  
61 Peinado gives an explanation of alienation in his discussion of tense. See De anima, lib. 2, d. 6, s. 
4, n. 66, pp. 400-01: “The verb in a proposition is often so affected by the character [ratione] of the 
particle placed on the part of the predicate that, although the verb itself properly signifies the 
present, nevertheless when it is conjoined with that particle it does not signify anything about the 
present, but about the past or future. Thus the verb ‘is’, taken in itself, signifies an existence of the 
present and nevertheless when it is conjoined with the particle ‘dead’ in this proposition ‘Peter is 
dead’, it does not signify that Peter presently exists, but that he existed in the past, since it is 
equivalent to this proposition, ‘Peter existed, and does not now exist’.” In Phys. (lib. 1, d. 7, s. 2, n. 
25, p. 183) Peinado attributes the alienation doctrine to Francisco Alonso (Alphonsus), who 
describes alienation as follows: “In propositions de tertio adiacente the verb ‘to be’ is sometimes 
taken from its proper signification to another signification. It happens this way in the following 
propositions: ‘Peter is dead’, and ‘The Antichrist is future’. If the particle ‘is’ were placed without 
another predicate, it would signify that Peter and the Antichrist now exist. But because other 
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too far afield, and we need not understand the details of alienation in order to 
appreciate the kind of move, broadly speaking, that Peinado is making here. The 
claim is that a certain natural language sentence that we routinely treat as true 
turns out false upon closer metaphysical or scientific inspection. (‘The sun is 
rising’, for example.) However, there is a nearby sentence that more closely 
tracks the purported metaphysics and accordingly turns out true, and we treat 
the latter (true) sentence as somehow equivalent to the former (false) sentence. It 
is a difficult and controversial matter what could be the relationship between the 
true and the false sentence: alienation, regimentation, paraphrase, synonymy, 
analysis, translation, meaning, etc. At any rate, the sort of move Peinado is 
making in the above passage should be familiar to contemporary philosophers in 
the Quinean tradition, even if the details are not. 
  
6. CONCLUSION 
Peinado thinks that negative truths do not have truthmakers in the positive 
sense. In contemporary terminology, Peinado’s view effectively restricts the 
truthmaker principle to positive truths. But contemporary philosophers often 
reject such a restriction of the truthmaker principle as ad hoc. It is now clear how 
Peinado would answer the charge of adhocitas.62 Peinado would answer Cameron 
by saying that it is “ok for negative truths to go ungrounded” because the 
intentional mode view of affirmation and negation, the aboutness constraint on 
truthmaking, and the analysis of truth for positive truths jointly entail that 
negative truths do not have truthmakers in the positive sense. And Peinado 
                                                                                                                                            
predicates are added to it, in the first place it signifies that Peter existed and now does not, and in 
the second place it signifies that the Antichrist does not exist now by will at some later time. The 
same goes for these propositions, ‘Peter is possible’ or ‘Peter is not contradictory’. In these 
propositions the particle ‘is’, by reason of the predicate adjoined to it, is taken to signify that if 
Peter were to exist, a contradiction would not follow. Grammarians call this ‘alienation’, since, 
the copula is transferred from its proper to an alien signification because of an adjoined term.” 
(Translated from Jacob Schmutz, La querelle des possibles: Recherches philosophiques et textuelles sur la 
métaphysique Jésuite Espagnole, 1540-1767, (unpublished dissertation, Université Libre de Bruxells, 
2003), vol. 2, 1091, fn. 33. 
62 I have long felt that philosophers need an abstract form of ad hoc, and I prefer the scholastic 
barbarism ‘adhocitas’ to the linguistic mongrel, ‘ad-hocness’.  
 28 
would simply deny Merricks’s claim that “the only reason to scale back 
Truthmaker to exempt negative existentials is that there do not seem to be 
truthmakers for negative existentials.” Although he agrees that there do not seem 
to be truthmakers for negative existentials, Peinado restricts the truthmaker 
principle because he independently endorses the intentional mode view of 
affirmation and negation, a certain analysis of truth for positive truths, and the 
aboutness constraint on truthmaking. Of the three doctrines, only the intentional 
mode view was not mainstream among his Jesuit contemporaries. And as we 
have seen, Peinado endorses the intentional mode view because he thinks it 
alone can account for the distinction between positive and negative force, and it 
alone can account for the difference between positive and negative propositions.  
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